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Abstract
In this paper, we modify the extendible debts model proposed in Longstaff (1990) to help
relieve the moral hazard problem induced in the original model. In Longstaff¡¦s model,
extending the maturity of the defaulted debts gives the borrower an incentive to default even
if the borrower is insolvent. In this paper, we argue that the debt should not be extended if it
is defaulted severely. We have shown that the extendible debt valuation can be obtained by
the compound option pricing besides the PDE approach. We also have derived the fair
interest rate of the extendible debts in this paper.
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1. Introduction 
  In this paper, we modify the extendible debts model originally proposed by 
Longstaff (1990). To help relieve the moral hazard problem induced by Longstaff’s 
model, the debt is not extended if it is defaulted severely under our specifications. 
And we have shown that the extendible debts valuation can be obtained by the 
compound option pricing technique besides the PDE approach utilized in Longstaff 
(1990). We also have derived the fair rate of this kind of extendible debts in our 
model. 
  Longstaff (1990) first thoroughly investigates the valuation and related issues of 
options with extendible maturities. He classifies options with extendible maturities as 
“holder-extendible options” and “writer-extendible options”. The primary difference 
is that whether the extension of maturity is chosen by the optionholder or granted by 
the writer. Based on the writer-extendible puts, Longstaff continues to price the 
extendible bonds and show that the bondholder has an incentive to extend the debts 
when defaults occur if large liquidation costs incur. 
Moraux and Navatte (2004) relax the assumption of Longstaff (1990) and find 
out that the extension solution is especially valuable when the financial distress is not 
severe, when contributions from the stockholders are significant, or when the 
realization rate is time-varing and increasing. Their motivations come from that, 
creditors may sometimes grant a very long time to safe only a negligible part of their 
claims as shown in the simulations of Longstaff (1990). One alternative resolution to 
the defaulted debts is the renegotiation of the loan balance. Harding and Sirmans 
(2002) and Miceli and Sirmans (2007) find out conditions under which the maturity 
extension is preferred to the renegotiation. That is, the dead weight loss from 
foreclosure is not too large. 
One of other drawbacks of Longstaff (1990) is that the solvent debtor may have 
an incentive to cause the occurrence of defaults if the extension scheme is known in 
advance. Longstaff states that “shareholders in a nearly or slightly bankrupt firm may 
have an incentive to take on negative NPV projects in order to drive down the value 
of the firm”. Technically speaking, this is because the stockholders’ value is not a 
monotone increasing function of the firm’s assets value if taking the debts extension 
into consideration. When defaults occur, the lender has an incentive to extend the debt 
if there are large liquidation costs. But the extension itself will stimulate the 
occurrence of defaults. In this paper, we try to mitigate this moral hazard problem by 
suggesting the threshold of collateral value. That is, the creditor extends the debt if the 
default is not too severe. But if the stockholders drive down the firm’s assets value 
such that the value is below the threshold, stockholders will be punished by the 
declaration of the firm’s bankruptcy.  2
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our model and values the 
extendible debts in our settings. Sections 3 proposes one of the possible extensions in 
this line of research. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. The Valuation of Extendible Debts 
Consider this kind of loan arrangement: At time 0, the creditor lends 
rT De
−  to 
the debtor (a firm) (where  r  denotes the loan rate), and the firm pledges its total 
assets (whose value is denoted as  A) as the collateral for the loan. At time  T , the 
debtor repays  D to the creditor and the collateral is returned. But if at maturity the 
borrower is unable to meet the liability and the asset value of the firm is below  D 
but above  D φ   () 1 0 < <φ , the creditor will not liquidate the collateral at once but 
extends the debt to time  τ + T  instead. If at time T ,  A is below  D φ , then the 
collateral is liquidated immediately. Should the debt be extended to time  τ + T , the 
firm also repays  D. The interests are not charged during the maturity extension 
period, as in Longstaff (1990). But if the borrower defaults at time  τ + T , the debt 
owner will liquidate the collateral and absorb any losses if possible. 
Assume that under the risk-neutral probability measure Q, the value of the firm’s 
assets can be described by the following process : 
  t t f t dW dt A r dA σ + = ,            ( 1 )  
where rf is the risk-free rate,  σ  denotes the volatility of the firm’s value, and  t W is 
the Wiener process. Under such loan contract, we can say that at time T, the firm is 
granted a portfolio (a standard put plus two kinds of compound options) if the firm 
defaults but is still tolerated by the creditor. And at time T the firm is liquidated 
immediately if the firm defaults severely (the debt is deeply “out-of-the-money”). The 
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where  () ( ) τ σ δ δ
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and  () ⋅ N   denotes the CDF of a standard Normal distribution), which is the price of a 













τ .        ( 3 )  
To value this kind of debt in the start, we then need to calculate the price of  T P at 
time 0, and let’s denote it as P. That is,  ( ) T
Q T r P E e P
f − = . Note that  T P  can be  3
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Let the prices of  T P 1 ,  T P 2 , and  T P 3  be denoted as  1 P , 2 P , and 3 P . P can now be 
derived by  3 2 1 P P P P + + = . 
  First, it can be seen that  T P 3  is the payoff of a European put option and by the 
Black-Scholes formula,  3 P   can be obtained as 
   () ( ) T N A N De P
T rf σ α α − − − − =
−























, and  0 A   denotes the firm’s assets value at time 0. 
Second, we can compute  2 P   by the compound option pricing (Geske (1979)). If 
at time T, the payoff of the debtor from  T P 2  is  K F −  when  D AT φ ≥  and nothing 
otherwise, then  T P 2   is indeed the payoff of a compound option (a call on a put) with 
strike price K and  2 P  is of the form  ( ) ( )( ) ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
− − N Ke AN N De
rT T rf , , , , , where 
() ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , N   denotes the CDF of a standard bivariate Normal distribution. But now that the 
underlying option (whose payoff a time  τ + T  is  τ + T F ) is granted costlessly if the 
compound option is in-the-money at time T (a writer-extendible option in the sense of 
Longstaff (1990)), then letting  0 = K ,  2 P  becomes 
  ( ) ( ) ρ θ α ρ τ σ θ σ α , , , , 0 2 − − − + + − + − =
− N A T T N De P
































  Third, note that  T P 1  is the payoff of a compound option (a call on a put) with 
strike price zero but in a short position.  1 P   can be obtained accordingly  4
   ( ) ( ) ρ τ σ θ σ β ρ θ β , , , , 0 1 + + − + − − − − =
− T T N De N A P























 Since  3 2 1 P P P P + + = , P can be obtained as 
( ) ()
() () ()
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  We now proceed to derive the fair interest rate of the extendible debts in our 
settings. Consider two kinds of risk-free investments. One is to engage in riskless 
lendings directly. The other is to make the extendible loans in out settings and at the 
same time long a portfolio whose payoff at time T is  T P . Therefore, under both 
investment projects, the creditor can receive  D at time T. To rule out the arbitrage 
opportunity, the costs of the two kinds of investments at time 0 must be equal. That is, 
P De De
rT T rf + =
− − . The fair interest rate of extendible debts in our settings is as 
follows: 
   ( ) f
T r r T De P r
f + − − =
− / 1 l n ,           ( 1 2 )  
where  P   can be obtained in (11).  
 
3. The Endogenization of the Threshold Parameter 
  Since we have modified Longstaff (1990) and taking all the parameters as given, 
we also have shown how to value the extendible loans under new model 
specifications. What follows is to endogenize the parameters. We can decide the 
threshold under which the lender will not extend the debts if the borrower defaults 
severely. That is, the creditor solves the following optimization problem at time 0: 
() 0 , ,
1 0 >
≤ ≤ φ
φ D A H Max ,           ( 1 3 )  
where  () ⋅ H  is the gain function defined similarly in Longstaff (1990). In Longstaff 
(1990), the gain function is used to decide the optimal extension period τ  if the 
borrower defaults. In our case, we have to fix τ  and then to decide the optimal 
threshold  φ . If  φ   is set too low (that is,  0 ≈ φ ), then the debt is extended for almost 
all cases when default occurs. This is not helpful for alleviating the moral hazard 
incentives of borrowers. But if  φ  is set too high (that is,  1 ≈ φ ), the debt is hardly 
extended when default occurs. Hence, it is expected that the optimization problem in  5
(13) has an interior solution. To complicate the case, one can also decide the extension 
period  τ   and the threshold  φ  simultaneously. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we modify the extendible debts model proposed in Longstaff (1990) 
to help relieve the moral hazard problem induced in the original model. In Longstaff 
(1990), extending the maturity of the defaulted debts gives the borrower an incentive 
to default even if the borrower is solvent. In our model, the debt is not extended if it is 
defaulted severely. And we have shown that the extendible debt valuation can be 
obtained by the compound option pricing besides the PDE approach. We also have 
derived the fair rate of this kind of extendible debts in this paper. For future research, 
we will endogenize the threshold under which the debts are not extended. 
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